A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation

A system-theoretic approach to cooperation, interaction and allocation is presented that simplifies, unifies and extends the results on classical cooperative games and their generalizations. In particular, a general Weber theory of linear values is obtained and a new theory for local cooperation and general interaction indices is established. The model is dynamic and based on the notion of states of cooperation that change under actions of agents. Careful distinction between “local” states of cooperation and general “system” states leads to a notion of entropy for arbitrary non-negative and efficient allocations and thus to a new information-theoretic criterion for fairness of allocation mechanisms. Shapley allocations, for instance, are exhibited as arising from random walks with maximal entropy. For a large class of cooperation systems, a characterization of game symmetries in terms of λ-values is given. A concept for cores and Weber sets is proposed and it is shown that a Weber set of a game with selection structure always contains the core.