A new approach to agglomeration problems |
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Institution: | 1. Universidade de Vigo, ECOSOT Economía, Sociedad y Territorio, Vigo, Spain;2. Université de Saint-Étienne, GATE UMR 5824, Saint-Étienne, France |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we study a location problem with positive externalities. We define a new transferable utility game, considering there is no restriction on the transfer of benefits between firms. We prove that the core of this game is non-empty, provide an expression for it, and an axiomatic characterization. We also study several core allocations, selected by means of a certain bankruptcy problem. |
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Keywords: | Location problem Positive externalities Cooperative game Core Axiomatic characterization |
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