生产成本信息不对称下差异Bertrand结构中的许可

建立了差异Bertrand结构市场中,成本降低型厂商创新者在关于生产厂商的生产成本信息不对称条件下,与生产厂商之间的技术许可博奕模型,并分析了从厂商创新者角度出发的最佳许可策略.研究表明,最佳许可方式依赖于创新规模和市场差异程度,具体地说,当创新规模较大或者产品差异程度较大时,固定费用许可最优,反之,固定费用和提成相组合的方式最优.

Licensing in Heterogeneous Bertrand Markets under Asymmetric Information of Product costs

The optimal licensing schemes of a patent-holding firm's cost-reducing innovation to a potential licensee in a Bertrand duopoly under an asymmetric information framework on product cost are studied in this paper. It is shown that from the view of the patent-holding firm, the optimal licensing schemes rely on the magnitude of the innovation as wed as the degree of the heterogeneousnessin the market. Speeifically, in the case of large magnitude innocation or high heterogeneousness in the market, fixed-fee licensing is better, therwise, fixed-fee plus royalty licensing is superior.