Fall back equilibrium |
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| Authors: | John Kleppe Peter BormRuud Hendrickx |
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| Affiliation: | CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action. |
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| Keywords: | Strategic game Equilibrium refinement Blocked action Fall back equilibrium Bimatrix game |
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