寻租偏好视角下的标准化参会企业专利策略博弈研究

专利纳入标准使标准的公益性和专利的私利性之间的冲突愈发明显,部分企业在专利标准化过程中的为其低价值专利寻租行为必然会影响其他企业持续研发的积极性,不利于标准的构建和创新的发展。本文在寻租偏好视角下,运用专利组合理论构建了参与标准化企业专利行为博弈模型,并对企业专利行为的演化进行数值模拟,分析企业专利寻租行为的内在动机及寻租的影响因素。结果表明:领域专利组合强度足够大时,企业偏向于对标准必要专利寻租;针对排他性专利标准化竞争,企业能否寻租成功取决于竞争企业与本企业的专利组合强度的对比值;本研究结果以期为我国企业参与国际标准化专利决策提供支持。

A Game Study of the Patent Strategy of Standardized Participating Enterprises from the Perspective of Rent-seeking Preference

Patent inclusion criteria make the conflict between the public welfare of criteria and the self-interest of patents more obvious. Some enterprises' rent-seeking behavior for their low-value patents in the process of patent standardization will inevitably affect the enthusiasm of other enterprises for continuous research and development, which is not conducive to the construction of standards and the development of innovation. Based on the perspective of rent-seeking preference, we us enterprise patent portfolio theory to build the patent behavior game model, analyze the enterprises intrinsic motivation in standardization with numerical simulation of the evolution of enterprise patent behavior, and to explore the influence factors of enterprise of standard essential patents rent-seeking. The results show that the enterprises that apply for timely patents have certain characteristics. When the intensity of the patent portfolio of participating enterprises is large enough, enterprises tend to seek rent for SEP patents. For the exclusive patent standardization competition, the success of patent rent-seeking depends on the ratio of the strength of the patent portfolio between the competitors and the enterprise itself. The results of this study are expected to provide support for Chinese enterprises to participate in international standardized patent decision-making.