竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略

本文以两个竞争平台为研究对象，考虑消费者异质性和网络外部性下服务平台是否提供增值服务，分别构建了两个平台均提供/不提供增值服务(PP/SS)和仅一个平台提供增值服务(PS)三种情景下的收益模型，求解出各情景的最优价格、服务水平和收益，并探讨了竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略。研究发现：(1)若平台的服务提供者数量很低时，两个平台均会提供增值服务；随着服务提供者数量的增加，仅一个平台提供增值服务(PS/SP)是均衡。(2)平台服务提供者数量的增加会削弱增值服务的利润增长优势。此外，当平台的基本服务价值低于某一阈值时，服务提供者数量较高的平台不会提供增值服务；当基本服务价值高于某一阈值时，该平台会提供增值服务。

Equilibrium Strategies of Value-added ServiceInvestment with Two Competitive Platforms

This paperstudies two competing service platforms and considers whether the platform provides value-added services with the heterogeneity of consumers. Basedon whether the two competing platforms provide value-added services, we accordingly develop the profit models under three scenarios: neither platform provides value-added services (SS), only one service platform provides value-added services (PS), and both platforms provide the value-added service (PP). We derive the optimal price, service level, and discuss the value-added service investment equilibrium strategy of the two competitive platforms. We find: (1)If the number of platform service providers is low, both platforms will provide value-added services; with the increase in the number of service providers, only one platform provides value-added services (PS / SP) is the equilibrium outcome. (2)The increase in the number of platform service providers will weaken the advantage brought by value-added services. In addition, when the value of basic services is lower than a certain threshold, the platform with more service providers will not provide value-added services; when thevalue of basic service is higher, the platform will provide value-added services.