四方主体参与下的环境规制演化博弈分析

环境污染问题严重阻碍了我国经济和社会的发展,我国当下的环境治理逐步形成多主体治理模式。本文将环境治理中的四个主要相关主体“中央政府-地方政府-企业-公众”置于统一框架下,建立了四方演化博弈模型,并利用数值仿真模拟参数变化对博弈系统不同主体稳定策略的影响,得到以下结论:(1)四方演化博弈系统的16个纯策略均衡点中,共有8个条件稳定点,其余8个均衡点在任何条件下都不稳定。其中8个条件稳定点代表着我国环境治理中各利益相关主体可能呈现的策略均衡,策略集中某策略的相对净收益决定了相关主体的策略选择。(2)通过数值仿真分析发现,增大中央政府对地方政府消极执行的处罚、增大中央政府转移支付和增大中央政府对地方政府消极执行的追加处罚不仅能够提升地方政府的环保执法力度,而且可以提高企业减排积极性。提高环境规制标准、增大对企业非法排污的处罚,对地方政府、企业和公众的策略选择都会产生影响,可以使系统更快向“中央政府不严格监管、地方政府积极执行、企业合法排污、公众不举报”的理想稳定状态演化,但提高环境规制标准的效果会略优于加大对企业处罚。地方政府增大企业治污补贴短期内可有利于实现经济的可持续发展,但过高的企业治污补贴将不利于博弈系统达到理想稳定状态,是一种非长效的环境治理模式。提高公众举报奖励可以促使企业合法排污,并在一定程度上加快实现博弈系统的理想稳定状态。最后,分别从中央政府、地方政府和公众角度提出了环境治理的相关建议。

Game Analysis of the Evolution of Environmental Regulation with the Participation of Four Parties

The problem of environmental pollution has seriously hindered the economic and social development of our country. The current environmental governance in our country has gradually formed a multi-agent governance model. In this paper, the four main related subjects of environmental governance “central government-local government-enterprise-public” are put into a unified framework, and a four party evolutionary game model is established. Numerical simulation is used to simulate the influence of parameter changes on the stability strategies of different subjects in the game system, and the following conclusions are drawn: (1)among the 16 pure strategy equilibrium points of the four party evolutionary game system, there are eight conditions of stability. The other eight equilibrium points are unstable under any conditions. Among them, eight conditional stability points represent the possible strategic equilibrium of the stakeholders in environmental governance in China. The relative net income of a strategy in a strategy set determines the strategy choice of its related subjects. (2)Through the numerical simulation analysis, it is found that increasing the central government's punishment for the local government's negative execution, increasing the central government's transfer payment and increasing the central government's additional punishment for the local government's negative execution can not only improve the environmental protection law enforcement of local government, but also improve the enthusiasm of enterprises in emission reduction. The improvement of environmental regulation standards and the increase of penalties for illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises will have an impact on the strategic choices of local governments, enterprises and the public, which can make the system evolve to the ideal stable state of “the central government does not strictly supervise, the local government actively implements, the enterprises discharge pollutants legally, and the public does not report”, but the effect of improving environmental regulation standards will be slightly better than increasing the punishment to enterprises. The local government's increase of enterprise's pollution control subsidy can help to realize the sustainable development of economy in a short time, but the excessive enterprise's pollution control subsidy will not help the game system to reach the ideal stable state, which is a non long-term environmental governance model. Improving the reward of public report can promote the enterprises to discharge pollutants legally and accelerate the realization of the ideal stable state of the game system to a certain extent. Finally, from the perspective of the central government, local government and the public, the paper puts forward some suggestions on environmental governance.