基于电商平台的供应链广告决策和分销模式研究

本文建立包含一个制造商和一个电商平台的序贯博弈模型,讨论分销模式对供应链成员广告决策和收益的影响。电商平台中存在两种分销模式:批发模式下制造商将产品卖给平台,平台再进行零售;平台模式下制造商通过平台直接销售产品。另外,制造商和平台都可以选择是否参与广告活动并决定各自的广告投入。研究发现:两种分销模式下供应链成员都应参与广告活动;与批发模式相比,平台模式下制造商广告投入增加而平台广告投入降低。平台佣金率增加一定减小制造商的收益,但只有当制造商的广告效果或平台佣金率较小时,才会增加平台的收益。两种分销模式下供应链的总收益都低于纵向整合供应链的总收益;当平台佣金率适中时,制造商选择平台模式可以实现帕累托改进。

AdvertisingDecisions and Distribution Modes in the Supply Chain Based on E-commerce Platform

We formulate a sequential game theory model with one manufacturer and one platform to discuss the effects of distribution modes on the supply chain members' advertising decisions and profits. There are two distribution modesinthe platform: in the wholesale mode, the manufacturer provides its products to the platform and the platform then resell the products; in the platform mode, the manufacturer sells directly to the consumer via the platform. On the other hand, both the manufacturer and the platformfirstdecide whether to engage in advertising activities and then determine their respective advertising efforts. The results are as follows. The supply chain members should engage in advertising activities under both distribution modes, and compared with the wholesale mode, the manufacturer advertises more and the platform advertises less under the platform mode. The increase in the commission rate always decreases the manufacturer's profit, but increases the platform's profit only when the manufacturer's advertising effectiveness or the commission rate is low. The total profit of the supply chain under both distribution modes is smaller than the total profit of the vertically integrated supply chain. When the commission rate is moderate, the manufacturer's choice of the platform modewill lead to Pareto improvement.