旧工业建筑再生利用的政企演化博弈研究

为保护旧工业建筑的文化价值,助力解决棕地治理问题,提高地区竞争软实力,本文基于演化博弈理论构建了旧工业建筑再生利用的政企演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的演化稳定性及最优策略。博弈分析结果显示:政企双方存在四种演化稳定策略;企业对旧工业建筑进行再生利用的成本和收益、政府对相关企业的奖惩措施、旧工业建筑文化保护领域的媒体曝光度都会直接影响博弈结果。为实现可持续发展,政府应引入第三方监管机构,建立奖惩机制并广泛宣传旧工业建筑中蕴含的文化内涵;企业应主动寻求技术创新,积累再生利用旧工业建筑的相关经验。

Evolutionary Game Analysis between Governments and Enterprises in the Regeneration of Old Industrial Buildings

With the rise of new digital industrial manufacturing and the rapid development of large and medium-sized urbanization, more and more industrial enterprises have relocated or gone bankrupt, leaving a large number of idle old industrial buildings. To protect the cultural value of old industrial buildings, help solve the brownfield governance problem, and improve the soft power of regional competition, this paper builds an evolutionary game model for the regeneration of old industrial buildings. The evolutionary stability and optimal strategy of governments and enterprises are further analyzed. According to the results of the game analysis, the costs and benefits of regeneration of old industrial buildings, the government’s incentives and punishments for relevant enterprises, and the media attention to the cultural preservation of old industrial buildings will directly affect the game results. Based on evolutionary game analysis, we suggest that the government should introduce a third-party supervisory agency, establish a reward and punishment mechanism, increase subsidies for brownfield governance, and widely publicize the cultural content in old industrial buildings. Enterprises should actively seek technological innovation and accumulate relevant experience in the regeneration of old industrial buildings.