人与野生动物冲突利益均衡分析:一个动态博弈的过程

野生动物冲突补偿是保护野生动物资源、均衡各方利益的有效手段。本文通过2019年陕西省秦岭地区225个农户家庭的半结构化访谈,获得野生动物造成农作物损失的具体情况。运用演化博弈理论阐述野生动物破坏农作物的利益相关者(农户和政府)之间的复制动态方程以及演化稳定策略。研究发现,引入中央政府的激励约束机制才能确定实现最优稳定均衡策略的参数条件;农户只有得到至少720元/公顷的补偿,才愿意采取保护策略;当地政府只有在补偿标准小于2434.6/(1-β)时,才愿意采取补偿策略。因此,应当制定合理的补偿标准以便实现野生动物冲突的利益相关者之间的博弈均衡。

An Analysis of the Equilibrium of Human and Wildlife Conflicts in the Qinling Region of China: A Dynamic Gaming Process

Wildlife conflict compensation is an effective means to protect wildlife resources and balance the interests of all parties. The paper obtains the specific information about the loss of crops caused by wild animals in 2019, based on a semi-structured interview with 225 local families in the Qinling region of Shaanxi Province in China. The involved wildlife uses the extended game theory to explain the conflict between farmers and the government that are destroying and expanding wildlife. The theoretical research finds that the optimal stable equilibrium strategy (protection, compensation) cannot be achieved only through the evolution of farmers and local governments, and the central government’s incentive and constraint mechanism must be introduced to determine the parameter conditions for achieving the optimal stable equilibrium strategy. The empirical research shows that farmers in Shanxi Province should receive compensation of at least 720 Yuan per hectare,so that farmers are willing to adopt protection strategies. At the same time, if the compensation standard is less than 2434.6/(1-β), the local government is willing to adopt a compensation strategy. In order to achieve the balance of the stakeholders in wildlife conflicts, compensation standards should be formulated reasonably,and the cost of breach of compensation for compensation and the existing compensation supervision system should be established.