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Enhancement of Cooperation and Reentrant Phase of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Signed Networks
Authors:Jae Han Choi  Sungmin Lee  Jae Woo Lee
Affiliation:1.Department of Physics, Inha University, Incheon 22212, Korea;2.R & D Center, PharmCADD Co., Seoul 06180, Korea;3.Institute of Advanced Computational Sciences, Inha University, Incheon 22212, Korea
Abstract:We studied the prisoner’s dilemma game as applied to signed networks. In signed networks, there are two types of links: positive and negative. To establish a payoff matrix between players connected with a negative link, we multiplied the payoff matrix between players connected with a positive link by −1. To investigate the effect of negative links on cooperating behavior, we performed simulations for different negative link densities. When the negative link density is low, the density of the cooperator becomes zero because there is an increasing temptation payoff, b. Here, parameter b is the payoff received by the defector from playing the game with a cooperator. Conversely, when the negative link density is high, the cooperator density becomes almost 1 as b increases. This is because players with a negative link will suffer more payoff damage if they do not cooperate with each other. The negative link forces players to cooperate, so cooperating behavior is enhanced.
Keywords:game theory, prisoner’  s dilemma game, signed networks, cooperation
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