Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games — II |
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Authors: | Pradeep Dubey |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India;2. Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results. |
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Keywords: | ε -Nash equilibrium replication of an extensive game primitive Nash play |
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