Cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games |
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Authors: | A Haurie B Tolwinski |
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Institution: | (1) GERAD, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Montréal, Québec, Canada;(2) Department of Mathematics, Colorado School of Mines, Golden, Colorado |
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Abstract: | This paper addresses the problem of computation of cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games. The proposed approach contains as a special case the method of Green and Porter (developed originally for repeated oligopoly games), but it is more general than the latter in the sense that it generates nontrivial equilibrium solutions for a much larger class of dynamic games. This fact is demonstrated on two examples, one concerned with duopolistic economics and the other with fishery management. |
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Keywords: | Stochastic games dynamic games dynamic programming cooperative equilibria games with unobservable actions |
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