Preference-based unawareness |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, United States;2. Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, United States;1. Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea, South Korea;2. School of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, 53 Myeongnyun-dong 3-ga, Jongno-gu, Seoul, South Korea;1. Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics and the School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, PR China;2. Department of Economics, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego, California 92182, United States |
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| Abstract: | Morris, 1996, Morris, 1997 introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge and belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz et al., 2006, Heifetz et al., 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is characterized behaviorally as the event being null and its negation being null. |
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