Reputation-based strategy persistence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma |
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Affiliation: | 1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110819, China;2. School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, 100191, China |
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Abstract: | Understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma has received a lot of attention. In previous research, many scholars found that the reputation mechanism can promote cooperation, and the variation of reputation is consistent. However, in reality, according to both one's current action and past experiences, every individual's impression from others is modified to varying extent everyday. In other words, the length of duration of the same performance influences the diverse scale of their own reputation fluctuation. Therefore, a reputation-based strategy persistence mechanism, in which the increment of current reputation is determined by the persistence of last strategy, is proposed. Moreover, we introduce a parameter α to illustrate the impact of strategy persistence on reputation variation. The results of simulation show that the new mechanism paves the way for cooperation in evolutionary game, and the smaller α is, the better the mechanism performs. |
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Keywords: | Reputation Evolutionary game Cooperation Strategy persistence Complex network |
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