Core,least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games |
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| Institution: | 1. Departamento de Economı́a y Empresa, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Ctra. de Utrera Km. 1, 41012 Sevilla, Spain;2. Departamento de Economı́a Aplicada III, Universidad de Sevilla, Avda. Ramón y Cajal n°. 1, 41018 Sevilla, Spain;3. School of Management, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton 5017 1BJ, UK;1. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada 3 i, Escola Politècnica Superior d’Enginyeria de Manresa, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Spain;2. University of Yaounde I, MASS Laboratory, Cameroon;3. University of Cergy Pontoise, THEMA Laboratory, France;1. Department of Business and Management Science, NHH Norwegian School of Economics, N-5045 Bergen, Norway;2. Département de génie mécanique, Université Laval, Québec, G1V 0A6, Canada |
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| Abstract: | Multiple scenario cooperative games model situations where the worth of the coalitions is valued in different scenarios simultaneously or under different states of nature. In this paper we analyze solution concepts for this class of games keeping the multidimensional nature of the characteristic function. We obtain extensions of the notions of core, least core and nucleolus, and explore the relationship among these solution concepts. |
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