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基于多任务委托—代理理论的高校教师激励机制研究
引用本文:张立杰,吴映曈,曹雪梅. 基于多任务委托—代理理论的高校教师激励机制研究[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 2008, 38(22)
作者姓名:张立杰  吴映曈  曹雪梅
作者单位:1. 西安科技大学,党委办公室,陕西,西安,710054
2. 西安科技大学,测绘科学与技术学院,陕西,西安,710054
摘    要:对高校教师的激励是高等教育中一个非常重要的环节,对高校教师合理的激励机制设计是提高高等教育水平的制度保证.从教师激励工作中高校管理者作为委托人与高校教师作为代理人二者信息不对称的角度出发,运用博弈论与委托代理理论,将高校教师工作进行教学努力和科研努力的划分,运用多任务委托代理理论对教师激励机制进行研究,建立模型进行分析,并结合西安科技大学现实提出合理化建议,以求达到既提高教学质量又提高科研产出水平的目的.

关 键 词:教师激励  信息不对称  委托代理理论

Research on the Incentive Mechanisms for College Teachers Based on the Multi-task Principal-agent Theory
ZHANG Li-jie,WU Ying-tong,CAO Xue-mei. Research on the Incentive Mechanisms for College Teachers Based on the Multi-task Principal-agent Theory[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 2008, 38(22)
Authors:ZHANG Li-jie  WU Ying-tong  CAO Xue-mei
Affiliation:ZHANG Li-jie1,WU Ying-tong2,CAO Xue-mei2
Abstract:The stimulation to the high school teachers is an important link of high school education.The paper believes that the rational incentive mechanism design for the high school teachers is the institutional guarantee for enhancing high school education level.Based on the game theory and the principal-agent theory,from the perspective of the information asymmetry between the high school manager as the principal and the teachers as the agent,the paper divided the effort made by the teacher into teaching effort a...
Keywords:incentive mechanism for teacher  asymmetry information  principal and agent theory  
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