A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games |
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Authors: | M. Le Breton |
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Affiliation: | 1. Cremerc-Leme, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, 7, place Hoche, 35000, Rennes, France
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Abstract: | Consider a society with a finite number,n, of individuals who have to choose an alternative from a setA in them-dimensional Euclidean space IR m . Assuming that the preference relation overA of every individual is convex and continuous, Greenberg (1979) showed some that if the set of winning coalitions (i.e. those that have the veto power) consists of all coalitions with more thanmn/m + 1 individuals the core of the induced game is nonempty. Greenberg and Weber (1984) have strengthened this result by showing that the induced game is in fact balanced. On the other hand Le Breton (1987), Schofield (1984a) and Strnad (1985) have generalized Greenberg's theorem to arbitrary voting games. The purpose of this note is to show that however the induced game is not generally balanced. |
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