首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

基于利他偏好的电商供应链最优决策与契约协调
引用本文:林强,秦星红. 基于利他偏好的电商供应链最优决策与契约协调[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 2021, 0(4): 287-299
作者姓名:林强  秦星红
作者单位:重庆第二师范学院婴幼产品与服务供应链研究中心;重庆工商大学管理科学与工程学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71802031);重庆市教委人文社会科学研究基地项目(18SKJD044);重庆市社会科学规划培育项目(2019PY46)。
摘    要:构建了由一个占主导地位的电商平台和一个处于跟随地位的制造商组成的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究了电商平台有无利他偏好时电商供应链的最优决策和契约协调问题,并通过数值算例验证了本文的主要结论.研究表明:电商平台的利他偏好行为能够促使自身服务水平提高、正向影响制造商的最优销售价格并削弱自身利润.但电商平台的让利行...

关 键 词:利他偏好  电商供应链  契约协调  Stackelberg博弈

Optimal Decision and Contract Coordination of E-commerce Supply Chain based on Altruistic Preference
LIN Qiang,QIN Xing-hong. Optimal Decision and Contract Coordination of E-commerce Supply Chain based on Altruistic Preference[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 2021, 0(4): 287-299
Authors:LIN Qiang  QIN Xing-hong
Affiliation:(Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain,Chongqing University of Education,Chongqing 400067,China;School of Management Science and Engineering,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)
Abstract:A Stackelberg master-slave game model composed of a dominant e-commerce platform and a manufacturer in the following position was constructed.The optimal decision and contract coordination of e-commerce supply chain was studied with or without altruistic preference,and the main conclusions of this paper were verified through numerical examples.The research shows that the altruistic preference behavior of e-commerce platform can promote the improvement of its own service level,positively affect the optimal selling price of manufacturer and weaken its own profit.However,the profit-giving behavior of e-commerce platform can improve the profit level of manufacturer,alleviate the conflicts in the supply chain and improve the overall performance of the supply chain.The contract ofsales commission ratio+service cost sharingcan perfectly coordinate the e-commerce supply chain,so that the optimal profits of both parties achieve Pareto improvement,thus ensure that the e-commerce platform has sufficient incentives to carry out altruistic preference behaviors.In addition,further analysis shows that the altruistic preference of e-commerce platform positively affects the fixed technical service fee paid to e-commerce platform by manufacturer,the supply chain profit share and service cost sharing ratio of manufacturer,and negatively affects his own sales commission ratio.
Keywords:altruistic preference  e-commerce supply chain  contract coordination  stackelberg game
本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号