Efficient firm groups: Allocative efficiency in cooperative games |
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Authors: | Walter Briec Stéphane Mussard |
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Institution: | 1. CAEPEM, IAE, Université de Perpignan Via Domitia, 52 Avenue Paul Alduy, 66860 Perpignan Cedex, France;2. LAMETA Université Montpellier I, Avenue de la Mer – Site de Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France |
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Abstract: | The concept of efficiency in groups postulates that a coalition of firms has to record a smaller distance toward the aggregate technology frontier compared with the sum of individual distances. Efficiency analysis (either allocative or technical) is defined with respect to cooperative firm game in order to provide operational distance functions, the so-called pseudo-distance functions. These pseudo-distances belong to the core interior of the allocative firm game, in other terms, any given firm coalition may always improve its allocative efficiency. We prove that such a result is impossible for technical efficiency, i.e., the technical efficiency cannot increase for all possible coalitions. |
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Keywords: | Allocative efficiency Distance functions Games Productivity |
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