Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market |
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| Authors: | Shin Kishimoto Naoki Watanabe |
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| Institution: | a Department of Mathematical and Computing Sciences, Graduate School of Information Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Mail box W9-97, 2-12-1 Oh-Okayama, Meguro, Tokyo 152-8552, Japanb Department of Social Systems and Management, Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japanc Department of Social Engineering, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology 2-12-1 Oh-Okayama, Meguro, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan |
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| Abstract: | We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a general Cournot market. Our results are as follows: when the number of firms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder should extract the entire profits of all licensees. The outcome that the bargaining finally reaches exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable. The fair allocation represented by the Aumann-Drèze value is, however, not realized as such a stable bargaining outcome. |
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| Keywords: | C71 D43 D45 |
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