A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders |
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| Authors: | Professor R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans Professor R. J. Weber |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, University of Illinois, 61801, Urbana-Champaign, Il., USA
2. J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 60201, Evanston, Il., USA
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| Abstract: | An example is given of a sequential auction in which, at equilibrium, the expected profit of an informed bidder may be strictly less than the expected profit of an uninformed bidder. This phenomenon is interpreted in terms of the internal game between a player's “types” which arises in a setting of incomplete information. |
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