Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games |
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Authors: | M. Tu G. P. Papavassilopoulos |
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Affiliation: | (1) Bell Communications Research, Red Bank, New Jersey;(2) Department of Electrical Engineering Systems, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we study the impact of informativeness on the performance of linear quadratic Gaussian Nash and Stackelberg games. We first show that, in two-person static Nash games, if one of the players acquires more information, then this extra information is beneficial to him, provided that it is orthogonal to both players' information. A special case is that when one of the players is informationally stronger than the other, then any new information is beneficial to him. We then show that a similar result holds for dynamic Nash games. In the dynamic games, the players use strategies that are linear functions of the current estimates of the state, generated by two Kalman filters. The same properties are proved to hold in static and feedback Stackelberg games as well.This work was partially supported by the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research under Grant No. AFOSR-82-0174. |
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Keywords: | Nash games Stackelberg games information structure informational properties informationally stronger players Kalman filter |
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