Consistent values and the core in continuum market games with two types of players

The consistent value is an extension of the Shapley value to the class of games with non-transferable utility.? In this paper, the consistent value will be characterized for market games with a continuum of players of two types. We will show that for such games the consistent value need not belong to the core, and provide conditions under which there is equivalence between the two concepts. Received: October 1998 RID="*" ID="*"  This thesis was completed under the supervision of Professor Sergiu Hart, The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Department of Mathematics, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank Professor Hart for introducing me to this area of research, for his help and guidance, and, especially, for all his patience.? I would also like to thank Michael Borns for improving the style, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.