Selfish routing in public services |
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Authors: | Vincent A. Knight Paul R. Harper |
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Affiliation: | School of Mathematics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK |
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Abstract: | It is well observed that individual behaviour can have an effect on the efficiency of queueing systems. The impact of this behaviour on the economic efficiency of public services is considered in this paper where we present results concerning the congestion related implications of decisions made by individuals when choosing between facilities. The work presented has important managerial implications at a public policy level when considering the effect of allowing individuals to choose between providers. We show that in general the introduction of choice in an already inefficient system will not have a negative effect. Introducing choice in a system that copes with demand will have a negative effect. |
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Keywords: | Game theory Queueing theory Health care OR in health services |
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