Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by Exemption and Exclusion properties |
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Authors: | René van den Brink,Yukihiko Funaki,Gerard van der Laan |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. Department of Economics, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-Ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan |
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Abstract: | The Reverse Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems applies the Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA rule) for ‘large’ amounts of the estate, while it applies the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL rule) for ‘small’ amounts of the estate. The CEA rule, respectively CEL rule, can be axiomatized using the Exemption and Exclusion properties respectively. There is no rule that satisfies both these two properties. In this paper we axiomatize the Reverse Talmud rule by using compatible weaker versions of the Exemption and Exclusion properties. |
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Keywords: | Economics Decision support systems Game theory Bankruptcy rules Exemption Exclusion |
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