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非对称信息下的教育投资方博弈分析
引用本文:郭淑婷,邓英芝. 非对称信息下的教育投资方博弈分析[J]. 科技信息, 2009, 0(11)
作者姓名:郭淑婷  邓英芝
作者单位:天津大学管理学院;
摘    要:教育收益状况决定教育投资结构。本文针对教育过程中的三大投资方——政府、家长和校方的投资状况进行静态博弈分析,并认为参与各方均符合理性经济人假设,追求个人收益的最大化。对均衡解的分析表明:由于当前我国教育现代化仍处于发展过程中,信息不对称,处于卖方垄断地位的校方经常出现乱收费的现象,而学生只能选择缴费上学。为稳定教育市场,防止乱收费现象蔓延,政府应加大公共教育投资比例和监督检查工作执行力度。

关 键 词:教育投资  博弈  信息不对称  乱收费  

Game Analysis on Education Investment under Asymmetrical Information
GUO Shu-ting DENG Ying-zhi. Game Analysis on Education Investment under Asymmetrical Information[J]. Science, 2009, 0(11)
Authors:GUO Shu-ting DENG Ying-zhi
Affiliation:School of Management;Tianjin University;Tianjin 300072;China
Abstract:The structure of education investment is determined by the profit of the education. This paper focuses on the status of the education investment, and static game analyzes on the three major investors--the government, the parents of the students and the founders of schools, on the premise that they are rational economic persons and pursue maximum of individual utility. The equilibrium solution indicates that the school founders that are monopolizing the seller market will collect random fee and the students ...
Keywords:Education Investment  Game  Asymmetrical Information  Random Fee Collection  
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