Decoherent Histories and Realism

We reconsider the decoherent histories approach to quantum mechanics and analyze some problems related to its interpretation which we believe have not been adequately clarified by its proponents. We put forward some assumptions which, in our opinion, are necessary for a realistic interpretation of the probabilities that the formalism attaches to decoherent histories. We prove that such assumptions, unless one limits the set of the decoherent families which can be taken into account, lead to a logical contradiction. The line of reasoning we follow is conceptually different from other arguments which have been presented and which have been rejected by the supporters of the decoherent histories approach. The conclusion is that the decoherent histories approach, to be considered as an interesting realistic alternative to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, requires the identification of a mathematically precise criterion to characterize an appropriate set of decoherent families which does not give rise to any problem.