Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games |
| |
| Authors: | P. Jean-Jacques Herings Vincent J. Vannetelbosch |
| |
| Affiliation: | (1) CentER and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands (e-mail: P.J.J.Herings@kub.nl), NL;(2) CORE, University of Louvain, voie du Roman Pays 34, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, BE;(3) IEP, Basque Country University, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain (e-mail: vv@bl.ehu.es), ES |
| |
| Abstract: | There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way “best responses against small perturbations” are defined. It is shown that applying the spirit of these definitions to rationalizability leads to three different refinements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, respectively. We prove that weakly perfect rationalizability is weaker than both perfect and proper (Schuhmacher, 1995) rationalizability and in two-player games it is weaker than trembling-hand perfect rationalizability. By means of examples, it is shown that no other relationships can be found. Received: January 1997/final version: August 1998 |
| |
| Keywords: | : Rationalizability refinements |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
