| 合作进化的研究进展 |
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| 引用本文： | 张路,王浣尘,陈忠.合作进化的研究进展[J].上海交通大学学报,1999,33(10):1322-1328. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张路 王浣尘 陈忠 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学管理学院，上海 200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 阐述了合作的进化对于理解生物（包括人类自身）组织行为的重要性．合作的进化描述了生物行为策略的选择过程，互相剥夺还是互相合作．在理论模型中则取决于作用双方再次相遇的概率（即未来贴现）、环境噪声的大小、人口的结构特征、对策的发生机制等因素．较优的策略能在长期内获得较高的支付值，表征了个体对环境的适应性，体现了自然选择的结果．同时探讨了进化策略的稳定性，以及由Ｎｏｗａｋ 等引入的反映合作疆域之争的空间对策问题
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| 关 键 词： | 合作的进化 重复的囚犯博弈 进化稳定策略 空间对局 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467(1999)10-1322-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 1998年7月14日 |
Review on the Evolution of Cooperation |
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| ZHANG Lu,WANG Huan chen,CHEN Zhong School of Management,Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.,Shanghai ,China.Review on the Evolution of Cooperation[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,1999,33(10):1322-1328. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Lu WANG Huan chen CHEN Zhong School of Management Shanghai Jiaotong Univ Shanghai China |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Lu,WANG Huan chen,CHEN Zhong School of Management,Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.,Shanghai 200052,China |
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| Abstract: | Iterated prisoner's dilemma has been widely used as a standard metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation among biological societies. Theoretic and empirical developments since Axelrod's earlier argument of cooperation based on reciprocity were reviewed in this article, which including discussion of the role of shadow of the future, noise, population structure, number of players, and game decision mechanisms. Particular attention was paid to the research work on the evolutionary stable strategies and the spatial game dynamics proposed by Nowak. |
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| Keywords: | evolution of cooperation iterated prisoners dilemma evolutionary stable strategy spatial games |
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