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信息不对称约束下用水许可证拍卖制度设计
引用本文:李长杰,王先甲,范文涛. 信息不对称约束下用水许可证拍卖制度设计[J]. 运筹与管理, 2006, 15(6): 139-144
作者姓名:李长杰  王先甲  范文涛
作者单位:1. 武汉大学,系统工程研究所,湖北,武汉,430072
2. 中国科学院物理与数学研究所,湖北,武汉,430071
基金项目:国家科技攻关计划;南昌大学校科研和教改项目
摘    要:用水许可证制度是实施水资源统一管理的重要措施之一。行政配置中配置主体之间存在信息不对称,导致配置效率低,也存在“寻租”的可能。本文首先分析了信息不对称约束下的取用水许可证配置效率问题,然后引入拍卖理论,建立了信息不对称约束下的取用水许可证拍卖模型。属于多物品拍卖问题,本文给出了最优拍卖制度设计,实现取水许可证的高效配置,为取用水许可证的高效配置市场化方式提供借鉴作用。

关 键 词:水资源、水市场管理  用水许可证制度  多物品拍卖  信息不对称
文章编号:1007-3221(2006)06-0139-06
收稿时间:2006-06-15
修稿时间:2006-06-15

Design of Auction System of Iicense of Using Water due to Information Asymmetry
LI Chang-jie,WANG Xian-jia,FAN Wen-tao. Design of Auction System of Iicense of Using Water due to Information Asymmetry[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2006, 15(6): 139-144
Authors:LI Chang-jie  WANG Xian-jia  FAN Wen-tao
Affiliation:1. Systems Engineering Institute of Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China ; 2. Wuhan Institute of Physics and Mathematics, The Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan 430071, China
Abstract:The license system of using water is one of the important methods of integrated water resources management. In the allocation of license of using water, there are many disadvantages including low efficiency and rent seeking, because of information asymmetry between organizers and applicants. Auction theory is introduced in allocating license of using water for its predominance in solving information asymmetry. And the auction model of license of using water due to information asymmetry is found. Then the design of optimization of auction system is given.
Keywords:water resourses/water market management   license system of using water    multi-object auction   information asymmetry
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