| 隐性约束机制的设计研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 侯光明 甘仞初. 隐性约束机制的设计研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 1998, 7(4): 8-13 |
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| 作者姓名： | 侯光明 甘仞初 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京理工大学 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章研究在多阶段动态博弈情况下隐蔽行为的隐性约束机制设计问题，用博弈论方法和信息经济学的委托-代理理论方法，建立多阶段委托-代理关系约束问题重复博弈的声誉模型，对隐蔽行为的隐性约束机制进行研究，证明了多阶段委托-代理关系中隐性约束机制的存在，给出了这种情况下的有效约束条件，隐性约束机制的设计方法以及其他结论。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励 约束 隐蔽行为 显性约束机制 隐性约束机制 声誉 查获概率 委托－代理关系 |
Study on the Reputation Model of Multi--Stage Dynamic Game |
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| Hou Guangming Gan Renchu. Study on the Reputation Model of Multi--Stage Dynamic Game[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 1998, 7(4): 8-13 |
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| Authors: | Hou Guangming Gan Renchu |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden actoin in mult-stage dy-namic game. A reputation model for restriction on repeated principal-agent relationship is established by using the theory on principal-agent problem in information economics and the method of game theory to study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action. It is proved that there exists implicit restriction mechanism for the multi-stage principle-agent relationship,some conditions for effective restriction are derived,and the design methods of implicit restriction mechanism are presented. |
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| Keywords: | incentive restriction hidden action implicit restriction mechanism reputation model probability of discovery |
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