突发事件下不对称信息供应链协调机制研究

针对一个由供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链,在零售商成本为私有信息条件下,假设产品的市场需求为零售价格的指数函数,研究如何协调供应链应对突发事件。首先,给出了对称信息下供应链协调模型;然后,研究了不对称信息下集权式与分权式供应链的协调机制;再次,在突发事件引起零售商成本分布函数扰动情况下,通过引入供应商由于可能需要调整生产计划而产生的偏差成本,研究了供应链的最优应对策略。 研究表明,供应链的最优生产计划、最优批发价格和最优零售价格均具有一定的鲁棒性,当突发事件造成零售商期望成本在一定范围内发生扰动时,三者可以保持不变,当零售商期望成本扰动超过一定范围内时,则需要对之加以调整,才能有效应对突发事件。最后,通过数值仿真验证了相关结论。

Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism under Asymmetric Information and Disruptions

Focusing on a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, this paper studies how to coordinate the supply chain to respond to the disruption by supposing that the market demand of the product is the exponent function of the price under asymmetric information. Firstly, the coordination model under symmetrical information is given. Secondly, the coordination mechanisms of centralized supply chain and decentralized supply chain are researched. Thirdly, the optimal strategies under the fluctuation of the retailer cost distribution function caused by disruption are studied. The studies show that the optimal product plan, the optimal wholesale price, and the optimal retail price of the supply chain all have some certain robustness. When the expectation retail cost caused by disruption in a scope fluctuates, the three aspects keep unchanging. When the fluctuation of the expectation retail cost exceeds the scope, only the three aspects are adjusted so that the disruptions can be responded efficiently. Finally, through a numerical example some relational conclusions are verified.