首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Pattern formation,social forces,and diffusion instability in games with success-driven motion
Authors:Dirk Helbing
Institution:1.ETH Zurich, UNO D11, Universit?tstr. 41,Zurich,Switzerland
Abstract:A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the spreading and disappearance of strategies. In this paper, it is shown that success-driven motion can trigger such local agglomeration and may, therefore, be used to supplement other mechanisms supporting cooperation, like reputation or punishment. Success-driven motion is formulated here as a function of the game-theoretical payoffs. It can change the outcome and dynamics of spatial games dramatically, in particular as it causes attractive or repulsive interaction forces. These forces act when the spatial distributions of strategies are inhomogeneous. However, even when starting with homogeneous initial conditions, small perturbations can trigger large inhomogeneities by a pattern-formation instability, when certain conditions are fulfilled. Here, these instability conditions are studied for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that asymmetrical diffusion can drive social, economic, and biological systems into the unstable regime, if these would be stable without diffusion.
Keywords:PACS" target="_blank">PACS  02  50  Le Decision theory and game theory  87  23  Ge Dynamics of social systems  82  40  Ck Pattern formation in reactions with diffusion  flow and heat transfer  87  23  Cc Population dynamics and ecological pattern formation
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号