基于系统动力学的政府和废旧电子产品处理商演化博弈分析

文章为探究政府管制在废旧电子产品处理商实施生态拆解的作用,运用系统动力学方法构建了废旧电子产品处理问题中政府和处理商之间的一个混合策略演化博弈模型,并对政府管制策略选择与处理商实施生态拆解策略选择的互动机制进行了分析。演化博弈和系统仿真结果表明:处理商实施生态拆解和非生态拆解的收益、政府管制的有效性以及处理商实施非生态拆解受到惩罚等都直接影响系统的演化结果;政府和处理商两群体在3种情形下存在演化稳定策略;在一定的条件下,系统演化呈现周期性特征。最后从政府管制的角度出发,动态策略的演化博弈模型存在演化稳定的均衡点。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Dissembling Enterprises Based on The System Dynamics

In order to investigate the supervision of governments in the implementation of ecological dissembling effects of dissembling enterprises, this paper establishes a mixed-strategy game model of used electronic products’ dissembling between governments and dissembling enterprises based on the system dynamics method, and the interaction mechanism between governments and dissembling enterprises is analyzed. The results of the evolutionary game and system simulation show that dissembling enterprises getting the profits of the implementation of ecological dissembling and non-ecological dissembling, and effectiveness of government supervising, non-ecological dissembling punished and so on directly affect system evolutionary results. The evolution stable strategy exists in the the governments and dissembling enterprises in the three kinds of circumstances. Under certain condition, the system evolution presents the cyclical characteristics. Finally from the point of view of government supervising, and considering dynamic penalty strategy in the payoff matrix, the results show that stable equilibrium exists in the dynamic strategy evolutionary game model.