平台参与下网络食品安全政府监管策略研究

针对“互联网+食品”新兴业态产生的更为严峻的食品安全问题,本文研究政府对网络食品安全实施直接监管下的最优监管策略,以及在网络平台参与监管时政府的最优间接监管策略,并考虑了网络平台与食品企业合谋对监管效率的影响。结果表明,在食品安全问题被发现的概率越大或食品安全问题发生对政府影响较大时,选择直接监管策略会更优;但监管成本的增加会降低政府直接监管的动因,促使政府选择间接监管策略;比较两种策略可知,间接监管模式更能抑制平台与企业的合谋行为。此外,研究还表明在直接监管策略下,由于提高食品企业的惩罚力度会降低政府的监管强度,因此加大惩罚并不总能提高政府的效益;而在间接监管策略下,加大对网络平台的惩罚会使网络平台加大监管力度,从而提高政府的效益。

Research on Government Regulation Strategy of Internet Food Safety on Platform Participation

In view of the more serious food safety problems arising from the emerging Internet plus food business, this paper studies the optimal supervision strategy under the direct supervision of the government on network food safety, and the government's optimal indirect supervision strategy when the network platform participates in supervision. And it considers the impact of the network platform and food companies collusion on the efficiency of supervision. The results show that when the probability of food safety problems is found to be greater or the food safety problem has a greater impact on the government, the choice of direct supervision strategy will be better, but the increase of supervision costs will reduce the probability of direct government supervision, prompting the government to choose indirect regulatory strategy.Compared with the two strategies, the indirect supervision mode can more effectively inhibit the collusion between the platform and enterprise. In addition, the results also show that under the direct supervision strategy, increasing the punishment on food enterprises reduces the government's supervision intensity, so increasing punishment will not always improve the government's efficiency,but under the indirect supervision strategy, increasing the punishment on network platform will increase the supervision probability of the network platform, thereby improving the efficiency of the government.