纳入政策预期的国际气候博弈

本研究首先对Baumol和Oates构建的公共外部性模型的假设条件进行修正,从而构建起更符合实际的国际气候治理的数理模型;求解该数理模型,本研究推导出同时实现全球帕累托最优和自身财政收支平衡下,国际环境协议必须遵循的唯一政策规则;最后,以此为基础,本研究进一步构建起纳入政策预期的国际气候博弈模型,并通过数理分析论证,揭示了:如果世界各国都只考虑自身利益最大化,纳入政策预期下的气候博弈的均衡结果,将无法实现全球气候治理的帕累托最优。

Analysis of International Climate Game Considering Policy Expectations

This paper firstly modifies the assumptions of the public externality model constructed by Baumol and Oates to build a mathematical model that is more realistic in international climate governance. Subsequently, by solving the mathematical model, this paper deduces the only policy rules that the International Environmental Agreement (IEA) must follow to achieve the optimal balance of global Pareto-optimality and its own financial balance. Finally, based on the above analysis, this paper further constructs an international climate game model that incorporates policy expectations. It reveals that if countries in the world only think about maximizing their own interests, the game equilibrium result will not achieve the global Pareto-optimality of global climate governance.