Measurement and the verificationist theory/observation distinction |
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Authors: | Miklavž Vospernik |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy Faculty of Education, University of Maribor, Koroška 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia |
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Abstract: | In the following article, we propose to show that following the general verificationist epistemic programme (its demand that
the truth of our judgments be verifiable), the analysis of measurement on the one hand, and the classical positivist analysis
of common-sense observation on the other, do not lead to same conclusions. This is especially important, because the differences
in conclusions concern the positivist theory/observation distinction. In particular, the analysis of measurement does not
fully support this distinction. This fact might have important consequences for the problem of scientific realism and related
ontological and epistemological problems in the philosophy of science. |
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Keywords: | Verificationism Measurement B Ellis Theory/Observation distinction |
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