Preference aggregation and DEA: An analysis of the methods proposed to discriminate efficient candidates

There are different ways to allow the voters to express their preferences on a set of candidates. In ranked voting systems, each voter selects a subset of the candidates and ranks them in order of preference. A well-known class of these voting systems are scoring rules, where fixed scores are assigned to the different ranks and the candidates with the highest score are the winners. One of the most important issues in this context is the choice of the scoring vector, since the winning candidate can vary according to the scores used. To avoid this problem, Cook and Kress W.D. Cook, M. Kress, A data envelopment model for aggregating preference rankings, Management Science 36 (11) (1990) 1302–1310], using a DEA/AR model, proposed to assess each candidate with the most favorable scoring vector for him/her. However, the use of this procedure often causes several candidates to be efficient, i.e., they achieve the maximum score. For this reason, several methods to discriminate among efficient candidates have been proposed. The aim of this paper is to analyze and show some drawbacks of these methods.