Share the gain,share the pain? Almost transferable utility,changes in production possibilities,and bargaining solutions |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada;2. University of Toronto Scarborough, Canada;3. Western University, Canada;4. Brock University, Canada;5. St. Michael''s Hospital, University of Toronto, Canada;1. Department of Emergency Medicine, The Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University, 55 Claverick St, Providence, RI 02903, United States of America;2. Department of Epidemiology, Brown University School of Public Health, 121 South Main Street, Providence, RI 02903, United States of America;3. Rhode Island Hospital, 593 Eddy St. Providence, RI, 02903, United States of America;4. COBRE on Opioids and Overdose/Rhode Island Hospital, 164 Summit Ave (1125 N. Main Bldg), Providence, RI 02906, United States of America;5. The Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University, 222 Richmond St, Providence, RI 02903, United States of America;1. Copenhagen Business School and IZA, Department of Economics, Porcelaenshaven 16A, Frederiksberg 2000, Denmark;2. Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal, CIRANO and IZA, C.P. 8888, Succ. centre ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3P8, Canada |
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| Abstract: | We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions may preclude transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). Holding the disagreement point fixed, we show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to either benefit jointly or suffer jointly with any change in production possibilities under well-behaved generalized utilitarian bargaining solutions (of which the Nash bargaining and the utilitarian solutions are special cases). We apply the result to policy analysis and to incentive compatibility. |
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