Pritchard,Revisionism and Warranted Assertability |
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Authors: | Nathan Cockram |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Philosophy,University of British Columbia,Vancouver,Canada |
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Abstract: | Against contextualism, Duncan Pritchard has argued that conversational pragmatics give rise to an argument in favour of invariantist neo-Mooreanism. More specifically, he argues that when we conjoin a Moorean view with a warranted assertability manoeuvre, we can satisfy our pre-theoretical intuitions (which are decidedly invariantist), whereas contextualists cannot. In the following paper, I challenge Pritchard’s argument and contend that he is too quick to declare victory for invariantism, for not only does the WAM he employs appear to be ad hoc vis-à-vis DeRose’s plausible criteria, but it also seems to have very implausible pragmatic implications when subjected to close scrutiny. |
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