The New Riddle of Induction and the New Riddle of Deduction |
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Authors: | Gal Yehezkel |
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Affiliation: | 1.Department of B.A. in Liberal Arts and Sciences,The Sapir Academic College,Sha’ar Hanegev,Israel;2.Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies,The Open University of Israel,Raanana,Israel |
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Abstract: | Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on the analogy between induction and deduction in order to explain why some predicates, such as “grue,” are unprojectible. |
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