付费模式与评级制度对信用评级机构竞争的影响研究

基于信用评级行业的关键作用与改革争议,本文根据信用评级行业的双边市场特征,建立由信用评级机构、债券发行方、债券投资者组成的平台竞争模型,设定了发行方付费且单评级、投资者付费且单评级、发行方付费且双评级的三种信用评级制度,对信用评级机构的竞争行为与社会福利进行对比分析。研究发现:目前主流的发行方付费且单评级制度下,信用评级机构的评级费用和利润水平均为最高,社会总福利水平则居中。在单评级制度下推广投资者付费模式,可以在信用评级机构受冲击最小的情况下,适当提高社会总福利水平,不失为当前我国信用评级制度改革的最佳选择。单评级制度下,信用评级机构可以通过增加差异化程度来提高评级费用和利润水平,但在双评级制度下则面临全新竞争决策的挑战。

Research on the Influence of Payment Model and Rating System on the Competition of Credit Rating Agency

Based on the reform controversy and the key role of the credit rating industry, this paper establishes a platform competition model consisting of credit rating agencies, bond issuers and bond investors according to two-sided market characteristics of the credit rating industry. In order to compare the competition behavior and social welfare of credit rating agencies, the model sets the three institutional backgrounds of issuer-pay & single-rated, investor-pay & single-rated and issuer-pay & dual-rated. The study finds that under the system of issuer-pay & single-rated, the credit rating agencies have the highest rating fees and profit levels, and the social total welfare level is in the middle. Promoting investor-pay under the single-rated system can appropriately improve the total social welfare level, and credit rating agencies are least affected. Therefore, investor-pay & single-rated is the best choice for the current reform of China's credit rating system. Under the single-rated system, credit rating agencies can increase the rating price and profit level by increasing the degree of differentiation, but under the dual-rated system, they face the challenge of new competitive decision-making.