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考虑消费者忠诚的雇员激励契约设计
引用本文:张艳琳,窦祥胜. 考虑消费者忠诚的雇员激励契约设计[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(6): 234-239. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0205
作者姓名:张艳琳  窦祥胜
作者单位:西南交通大学 经济管理学院,四川 成都 610031
基金项目:国家社会科学基金资助项目(10XJY004)
摘    要:在信息不对称条件下,企业雇主如何在员工行为无法被观测到的情况下达到最优绩效成为企业上层需要解决的重要问题。在此背景下,区别于既有文献,本文根据服务型企业以消费者为中心的特点,将消费者忠实度纳入委托——代理模型,通过设计企业激励契约机制,探讨了企业雇佣员工的最佳方式。结果表明:(1)长期稳定工作的员工会选择提成工资制,这类员工倾向于将努力水平用于提高消费者忠诚度,其选择的结果能为企业带来利润;(2)短期非稳定工作的员工选择固定工资制,这类员工的零付出将给企业造成亏损,且损失额即为短期非稳定员工的固定工资额;(3)选择提成工资制的员工将给服务型企业带来正效益,而选择固定工资制的员工给企业带来固定工资的损失额。本文从企业雇佣员工方式的角度,为企业更偏向于为直接面对消费者创造业绩的服务型员工采取提成工资制,而为没有直接面对消费者的非服务型员工采用固定工资制提供了一种解释,有助于把握企业管理的着力点,进而增强企业绩效提升对经济发展的推动性作用。

关 键 词:服务型企业  消费者忠实度  提成工资制  委托代理模型  
收稿时间:2019-09-29

Incentive Contract Design Considering Consumer Loyalty
ZHANG Yan-lin,DOU Xiang-sheng. Incentive Contract Design Considering Consumer Loyalty[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(6): 234-239. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0205
Authors:ZHANG Yan-lin  DOU Xiang-sheng
Affiliation:College of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong Universuty, Chengdu 610031, China
Abstract:Under the condition of information asymmetry, how to achieve optimal performance of employers in the absence of employee behavior can be an important issue that needs to be solved at the upper level of the enterprise. In this context, different from the existing literature, this paper, based on the consumer-centered characteristics of service-oriented enterprises, incorporates consumer loyalty into the principal-agent model, and discusses the best ways for companies to hire employees by designing the incentive contract mechanism. The results show that: (1)employees who work stably for a long time will choose the wage system. These employees tend to use the effort level to improve consumer loyalty, and the result of their choice can bring profits to the enterprise; (2)short-term instability The employees of the work choose a fixed salary system. The zero pay of such employees will cause losses to the enterprise, and the loss is the fixed salary of the short-term unsteady employees; (3)The employees who choose the commission system will bring the service enterprises Positive benefits, while employees who choose a fixed wage system bring a fixed salary loss to the company. From the perspective of the way companies employ employees, this paper adopts a wage system for service employees who are more inclined to directly create performance for consumers, and a fixed salary system for non-service employees who do not directly face consumers. An explanation helps to grasp the focus of enterprise management, and thus enhance the impetus of corporate performance improvement on economic development.
Keywords:service-oriented enterprise  consumer loyalty  commission system  principal-agent model  
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