绿色技术创新利益相关者的三群体演化博弈及其仿真

基于利益相关者和演化博弈理论,探讨绿色技术创新活动中相关利益主体的角色和作用,并构建政府、企业和公众间的三群体演化博弈模型,运用MATLAB仿真分析政府、企业及公众在不同稳定性条件下演化决策行为。研究表明:绿色技术创新活动中政府、企业及公众三个参与主体间行为选择策略存在路径依赖;政府的公众环保宣传力度并非越强越好,适度的公众环保宣传有助于推动绿色技术创新发展,过度宣传反而会因高成本而阻碍绿色技术创新;政府征收污染税费并采取技术创新激励会推动企业采纳绿色技术创新,但高额的技术创新激励会抑制政府的环境规制。因此,政府应完善环境规制的政策法规,增强企业绿色技术创新主体地位,激励公众的监督积极性,形成政府-企业-公众合力,共同推动绿色技术创新发展。

Three Parties' Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders in Green Technology Innovation and Their Simulation

Based on Stakeholder Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory, this paper explores the roles and functions of relevant stakeholders in green technology innovation activities, and constructs evolutionary game model among the government, enterprise and public, and uses MATLAB simulation to analyze the evolutionary decision-making behavior of three-group under different stability conditions. The results show that there is a path-dependence in the behavior selection strategies among the government, enterprise and public in the green technology innovation activities. Appropriate government public environmental protection publicity implementation can promote green technology innovation development. Furthermore, government's technological innovation incentives drive companies to adopt green technology innovations, but high technological innovation incentives hinder government environmental regulation. The collection of pollution taxes and fees also will promote the adoption of green technology innovation. Therefore, the government can improve environmental regulations, strengthen the main position of green technology innovation of enterprises, and encourage the public's enthusiasm for supervision, so that the three parties work together to promote the development of green technology innovation.