中央环保督察背景下地方政府环境管制行为研究

中央环保督察对环境的改善效果备受肯定,但是这种改善效果的持续性却受到质疑。基于演化博弈理论,本文构建了地方政府和污染企业的动态复制系统,探究中央环保督察压力下空气质量改善的途径。研究结果表明:中央环保督察过程中,空气质量的改善可能来自于地方政府无差别的关停污染企业;中央政府一味地加大对地方政府环保失职的惩罚,可能会导致地方政府采取一刀切式的“懒政”、“怠政”行为;辖区的初始污染水平、管制成本均影响地方政府的行为选择。地方政府一刀切行为是多因素驱动的结果,中央政府应协调各方力量,理性决策,推动中央环保督察的良性运行。

Research on Local Government Environmental Governance Behavior Under the Background of Central Environmental Inspection

The improvement effect of the central environmental inspection has been affirmed, but the sustainability of the improvement effect has been questioned. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a dynamic replication system for local governments and pollution enterprises to explore the ways to improve environmental quality under the pressure of central environmental inspection. The results show that: in the process of central environmental inspection, the improvement of environmental quality may come from the indiscriminate shutdown of polluting enterprises; if the central government blindly increases the punishment for the local government, the local government may adopt a “one size fits all strategy”; the initial pollution and control cost in the jurisdiction affect the behavior choice of the local government. The local government's “one size fits all rectification” is the result of many factors, so the central government should coordinate all forces, make rational decisions, and promote the benign progress of central environmental supervision.