A game-theoretic equivalence to the Hahn-Banach theorem

Let Γ_X() = X, A (X), υ be a cooperative von Neumann game with side payments, where X is a nonempty set of arbitrary cardinality, A(X) the Boolean ring generated from P(X) with the operations Δ and ∩ for addition and multiplication, respectively, such that S² =S for all S ε A (X), and with ;() = 0. The Shapley-Bondareva-Schmeidler Theorem, which states that a game of the form Γ_X() = X, A (X), is weak if and only if the core of Γ_X(),ζ(Γ_X()), is normal, may be regarded as the fundamental theorem for weak cooperative games with side-payments. In this paper we use an ultrapower construction on the reals, , to summarize a common mathematical theme employed in various constructions used to establish the Shapley-Bondareva-Schmeidler Theorem in the literature (Dalbaen, 1974; Kannai, 1969; Schmeidler, 1967, 1972). This common mathematical theme is that the space L, comprised of finite, real linear combinations of the collection of functions, {χ_a : a ε A (X)}, possesses a certain extension property that is intimately related to the Hahn-Banach Theorem of functional analysis. A close inspection of the extension property reveals that the Shapley-Bondareva-Schmeidler Theorem is in fact equivalent to the Hahn-Banach Theorem.