演化博弈视角下军民融合协同创新合作稳定性分析

协同创新是实施军民融合深度发展战略的重要基础和内在动力。军民融合协同创新跨越军地,针对军民融合协同创新的合作后续稳定性问题,基于演化博弈理论,构建了有限理性下以军工企业和民用企业为参与主体的协同创新演化博弈模型,分析系统长期演化的结果与影响合作稳定性的因素,并用Matlab进行数值仿真。研究表明,军民融合协同创新合作稳定性与双方合作收益、违约金、政府激励正相关,与基本收益、研发成本、信息沟通成本、技术二次转化成本、风险成本、背叛收益负相关,存在合理的收益分配系数有利于合作稳定性,同时给出了政府激励力度的基础标准。最后,为提高合作稳定性提出针对性建议。

Cooperative Stability Analysis of the Collaborative Innovation of Civil-Military Integration Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Collaborative innovation is an important foundation and internal impetus for civil-military integration strategy. For exploring the stability of the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration across the military filed and , by using evolutionary game theory we set up the evolutionary game model for military and civilian firms based on the limited rationality. We analyze the long term evolutionary results and the factors that affect the stability, based on Matlab simulation. The results show that the stability analysis between the two sides of the game is positively related to the cooperation revenue, breach of contract and government incentives, and negatively related to the basic income, R&D cost, information communication cost, technical secondary conversion cost, risk cost & betrayal benefit. There is a reasonable distribution factor of revenue that contributes to the stability of cooperation, and we offer the basic standard of government incentives. At last, we come up with some pieces of practicable advice to boost the stability of process.