地方政府间治理空气污染行为的演化博弈与仿真研究

地方政府治理空气污染的执行力度是影响区域空气质量的直接因素,文中研究影响地方政府治理空气污染行为的因素。文章内容从演化博弈视角探讨地方政府自身及地方政府间协同治理空气污染的决策演化过程。研究显示,中央政府抽查行为,对地方政府的治理成本补贴,增大对地方政府的奖励与惩罚,增大对区域联合治理行为的惩罚与奖励,有助于提升地方政府治理空气污染行为的执行效力。研究结果表明,多元共治、互动监察、利益补偿等对提升地方空气污染治理的有效性具有重要意义。

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Study on the Act of ControllingAir Pollution between the Local Governments

The implementation of local government’s control of air pollution is a direct factor affecting regional air quality. The paper studies the factors affecting local government's behaviors of air pollution control. From the perspective of evolutionary game, the content of the paper explores the evolutionary process of making decisions that curb air pollution by local government itself and local governments from different regions. The research shows that such behaviors do help to enhance the effectiveness of local governments’ efforts to control air pollution: the central government's spot checks, the subsidies for local governments’ control cost,the increase of rewards and penalties for local governments and regional joint governance actions among them. The research results show that multi-dimensional governance, interactive monitoring, and interest compensation are of great significance for improving the effectiveness of local air pollution control.