公平关切下物流服务供应链质量缺陷承诺策略研究

考虑物流服务供应链中成员的公平关切行为,以Nash讨价还价均衡解作为公平收益参照点,构建Nash讨价还价公平关切下物流服务供应链质量缺陷承诺策略模型,分析和研究公平关切对最优策略、利润和效用的影响。研究结果表明,物流服务质量缺陷承诺水平随着物流服务集成商公平关切系数的增加而减少,却随着物流服务提供商公平关切系数的增加而增加;物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商公平关切系数的增加而减少,也随着物流服务提供商公平关切系数的增加而减少;当物流服务提供商的公平关切系数增加时,物流服务供应链中各成员的利润和效用以及整体利润和效用都会不断减少;但当物流服务提供商的公平关切程度一定而物流服务集成商的公平关切系数增加时,物流服务供应链中各成员的利润和效用以及整体利润和效用不断提高。

Quality Defect Guarantee Decision in Logistics ServiceSupply Chain with Fairness Concern

This paper incorporates the supply chain members’ behavior characteristics with fairness concern into logistics service supply chain. The Nash bargaining solution is regarded as the fairness reference point of the supply chain members. A model for service quality defect guarantee decision is established in the logistics service supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concern. We analyze the impact of fairness concern on the optimal strategies, profits and utilities. The results show that the logistics service quality defect rate guarantee decreases in the fairness concern coefficient of the logistics service integrator, and increases in the fairness concern coefficient of functional logistics service provider; the logistics service quantity decreases with the fairness concern coefficients of logistics services integrator and functional logistics service provider; as the logistics service provider’s fairness concern increases, the expected profits and utilities of two members and the whole supply chain decrease; but given that the fairness concern of functional logistics service provider is at a certain degree, the expected profits and utilities of two members and the whole supply chain increase as the fairness concern of logistics services integrator coefficient increases.